Notes and Comments

EXPLAINING
SUPPORT FOR DIVIDED GOVERNMENT Studies of ticket-splitting provide the theoretical foundation for examining public attitudes towards divided government. As mentioned, some scholars argue that divided government is the product of intentional but not necessarily conscious, voting behaviour, while others argue that divided government is unintentional or the by-product of other factors such as candidate-centred politics. Although these approaches seek to explain voting behaviour, the logic behind them works the same for understanding attitudes about divided government. Fiorina was one of the first scholars to propose an intentional ticket-splitting model of divided government voting.8 In Fiorina's model, ideologically moderate voters choose candidates from different political parties in an attempt to 'balance' them through divided control of government, thus producing middle-of-the-road policy outcomes. Faced with parties on the left and right of the ideological spectrum, voters located between the two parties choose a candidate from each side. To avoid the extremes of either party, then, middle-of-the-road voters choose a Democratic president and a Republican House member, or vice versa. This behaviour is especially strong under conditions of certainty such as those found at the midterm election.9
Crucial to policy-balancing models is the idea that voters see meaningful differences between the parties.10 Thus, party polarization will increase split-ticket voting and party convergence will diminish its frequency. Despite the many critics of policy balancing,11 evidence supportive of, or consistent with, its propositions represents a growing area of scholarship.12 One burgeoning area of inquiry about policy balancing comes from research on non-separable voting preferenceswhether a voter's preference for partisan control of Congress depends on the outcome of the presidential race or vice versa. Here, researchers have found evidence that voters take into account both branches of government -the larger policy-making picture -when expressing voting preferences.'3 In the context of the Jeffords switch, purposeful explanations of divided government would predict that ideological moderates who see a difference between the political parties will support Jeffords' party switch.
Yet, while an overall appreciation of the larger policy-making process lingers in the background of citizen consciousness, the primary actors involved in the Jeffords switch make up citizens' conscious thinking on the matter and, I contend, constitute the most accessible or important considerations on the matter. Democrats taking control of the Senate away from Republicans, obstructing President Bush's agenda and ultimately restoring divided government by the action of a single senator should increase the salience and importance of these actors. Unintentional or non-purposive theories of divided government emphasize such considerations. Non-purposive explanations propose that divided government is the product of well-recognized factors that shape 8 Fiorina, Divided Government. 9 Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. voting decisions, namely candidate attributes, issues and voter predispositions, such as party identification. None of these explanations posits purposive behaviour in the sense that voters intentionally choose candidates from different parties for Congress and the presidency to produce 'balanced' policy outcomes.
Voting for a congressional incumbent or quality challenger, for instance, may produce a split-ticket vote without any desire for divided government.14 Based on this reasoning, I expect Jeffords' constituents to evaluate the switch through the lens of incumbency and the 'personal vote'," the ingredients that routinely help congressional incumbents win re-election. Congress and the president, of course, also lie at the centre of Jeffords' decision and approval (or disapproval) of these actors will affect attitudes about the switch for both Jeffords' constituents, and the public at large. Supporters of President George W. Bush, not wanting to hinder his administration's agenda, will oppose the switch. Since at the time of the survey (late August) the Senate was firmly under the control of the Democrats and the House under the control of the Republicans, my expectations about congressional approval are less clear.
The weight voters assign to candidate characteristics depends on how strongly they identify with a political party. Voters with strong party attachments are less susceptible to candidate-driven factors whereas voters with weak party attachments are more likely to consider them. Not surprisingly, weak partisans or Independents are more likely to split their tickets than strong partisans are.16 1 expect partisanship to act as a lens through which citizens interpret politics, in this case to guide a citizen's response to Jeffords' decision.17 Simply put, Democrats will approve of the switch and Republicans will oppose it.
Issues may also cause voters to split their tickets in a given contest by giving one party an agenda advantage in a presidential or congressional race'8 or by matching the qualities voters seek in congressional and presidential candidates better.19 In Petrocik and Doherty's theory of issue ownership, parties try to set the agenda with issues they 'own' or on which they have an advantage.20 Republicans, therefore, stress taxes and crime and Democrats emphasize the environment and health care. In the end, the electoral advantage goes to the party that succeeds in this endeavour. The argument is easily extended to opinions towards the parties between elections. If the major issues of the day belong to the Republicans, they should benefit in the arena of public opinion and the same should hold true for the Democrats. Thus, citizens who believe the Democrats better able to handle the major issues of the day are more likely to approve of the Jeffords switch. The question provides most of the essential information without explicitly mentioning, 'divided government'. As discussed below, it probably represents an improvement over standard survey questions that ask about divided government in the abstract. Of course, it also has its limitations. Given that understanding public attitudes about divided government necessarily lies in the questions asked, I expound on the strengths and weaknesses of this question, especially as it relates to prior work on measuring voter attitudes about divided government.
Ideally, the question would have mentioned the president as well as his party affiliation. Since it does not, one could argue that it simply taps attitudes about Jeffords switching parties and handing control of the Senate over to the Democrats -and no more. In addition, the fact that the question mentions control of the Senate switching to Democratic party control fits nicely with policy-balancing explanations that 'presume that some citizens have a general appreciation of the institutional structure of American government and that such institutional considerations enter into their voting decisions'.23 I too assume that citizens have an overall sense of government by understanding that handing control of the Senate to the Democrats means divided government. This is a plausible interpretation of citizens' reactions to this question given that it highlights the fact that Jeffords' decision gave control of the Senate to the Democrats rather than other equally plausible considerations (such as admiration of politicians who exit the two-party system). Coupled with media coverage that highlighted the partisan implications of the switch, it is likely that respondents interpreted the question mostly in terms of the balance of power between the parties across the branches of government. Of course, many citizens may not think about 'divided government' or split-party control of government in explicit terms. Rather, they are likely to consider how a Republican president and Democratic Senate will offer alternative programmes, producing 'gridlock' and/or moderate policy outcomes. 22 The question also does not inform respondents about party control of the House of Representatives. Yet, this should not be a problem because policy-balancing takes place across branches, not within (e.g., House and Senate). Ideologically moderate balancers who thought the Democrats controlled the House would still prefer the Senate be in the hands of the opposite party of the president. Thus, because these models feature a president of one party balanced against a Congress controlled by the other party, not knowing a respondent's knowledge of control of the House should not stack the deck against intentionalist approaches. Furthermore, this should not be troublesome for testing unintentional explanations since they do not depend on this distinction. Partisans, for instance, will always want their party in control, regardless of who is currently in control.
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Another possible limitation of the question is that it concerns specific personalities and circumstances. Many studies on divided government have traditionally examined the House of Representatives given that it was (and is) more ideological and more party polarized than the Senate. Candidate-centred elements have traditionally played a larger role in Senate contests, so it is less likely that voters would easily discard these considerations. Despite this limitation, many of the idiosyncrasies of the Jeffords switch should not hinder or benefit either explanation for divided government. For example, if partisan control of government had been reversed, the predictions for intentional and unintentional explanations would not change. Ideological moderates who perceive differences between the parties, for instance, would be equally as inclined towards Jeffords' creation of divided government as they would be towards voting for it -the desire for split-party control is the same.24
Some may also argue that pre-existing partisan arrangements are troublesome for assessing unbiased attitudes towards divided government. For example, Lacy and Paolino criticize the NES question for containing 'a strong partisan component'. They conclude, 'The NES question ... does not separate a sincere preference for divided government from a conditional preference that depends on which party is already in power'. 25 The idea is that a Democrat and Republican party identifier will have a different opinion about divided government depending on the existing partisan control of government. However, the group posited as most desiring of divided government, ideological moderates, should not care about pre-existing partisan control of government. Indeed, theories of voting for divided government at the midterm presume knowledge of partisan control of the presidency and argue that because of such knowledge voting for divided government is more pronounced at the midterm.26 Under these conditions ideologically moderate voters -including voters previously unwilling to split their tickets under uncertainty during the presidential election year because they do not know the outcome of the presidential contest -choose candidates from the opposite party to 'balance' the president.27 In this way, the Jeffords switch 'mimics' the political environment of the midterm election. Reasoning under complete information, the Jeffords switch enables ideological moderates to express something akin to a 'real attitude' about divided government.
Despite limitations, the Jeffords' question has a few notable advantages over previous questions on divided government. A distinct advantage of the Jeffords' question is that it makes specific reference to all the actors involved and avoids abstraction. In contrast, survey questions about divided government typically inquire about partisan control of government in the abstract. The standard National Election Study (NES) question, for example, asks respondents whether they like it 'better when one party controls both the presidency and Congress; better when control is split between the Democrats and Republicans; or doesn't it matter?' Using this question from the 1992 NES, Sigelman, Wahlbeck and Buell tested whether voters who prefer divided government are more likely to split their tickets and found no relationship.28 They concluded that this question is a 'non-attitude', 'a complicated matter to which most people probably have given little thought'. Though it appears that approval of the Jeffords switch lies firmly in partisanship, ideology and attitudes towards political figures, other factors, when taken into account, may obscure these relationships. For these reasons, I formulate and test multivariate models of approval of the Jeffords switch.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES
To examine the impacts of the various factors on approval of Jeffords' party switch, I estimate a series of probit models. The dependent variable consists of two outcomes, approval (coded 1) and disapproval (coded 0). The independent variables include the partisan, ideological and politiciancentred variables from Table 1 , as well as control variables (see the Appendix for variable coding).
Where possible, I include all variables in each model. However, as mentioned, the Vermont poll includes items specific to constituents' opinions about the Jeffords switch. This discrepancy is not surprising given that Jeffords represents Vermont and many questions tapping the constituentrepresentative linkage are not relevant to citizens in other states. Not surprisingly, then, the Vermont poll includes more questions specific to the switch and generally allows a more thorough investigation than the national poll. Nevertheless, the national poll includes a few items not found in the Vermont data for testing theories of divided government. Table 2 presents the results of the probit analyses for Vermont respondents. The goodness of fit statistics suggest that the model does a good job explaining attitudes towards the Jeffords switch. The proportional reduction in error statistic (;p) suggests that the model produces over a 54 per cent reduction in error over the modal category. Using a two-tailed test of statistical significance, many of the predictors in the model are statistically significant at p < 0.05 or better.
Partisan considerations and politician-centred variables appear to be the predominant influences on approval of the Jeffords switch. Taking control of the Senate from Republicans, Democrats approved of the Jeffords switch; Democrat is statistically significant (p < 0.001) and in the predicted direction. For ease of interpretation, I calculated the change in predicted probability of approval of Jeffords' party switch. This procedure involved looking at a change in an independent variable from its minimum to maximum value while holding all other variables at their mean. Using this method, if a person identifies as a Democrat his or her probability of approving the Jeffords switch is 0.27 greater than a Republican, holding other variables at their mean. Independents were also likely to approve of Jeffords' decision. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant, p < 0.001. Substantively, identifying as an Independent increased the probability of approval by 0.18 compared to Republicans.
The coefficient for Jeffords' Approval is statistically significant at p < 0.001 and in the predicted direction. Substantively, this variable appears to have the largest effect on approval of the Jeffords switch. Vermonters that approved of Jeffords had a probability of approving of his party switch 0.58 greater than citizens who disapproved. This finding is consistent with candidate-centred explanations of ticket splitting that show the causes of divided government flow from well-funded and recognized, high quality candidates.34 Opinion about President Bush also figured prominently in Jeffords' 34 It is likely that approval of Jeffords' job as senator is an endogenous variable. In other words, not only does approval of Jeffords' job as senator affect approval of his party switch but also the reverse should be true. Unfortunately, the limitations of the data preclude a two-stage estimation of this potential endogeneity. Although the CBS News poll includes additional items concerning opinions of Jeffords (e.g., vote to re-elect) that might serve as instrumental variables, these variables correlate highly with both the endogenous regressor and the dependent variable, approval of the party switch. Accordingly, using these instruments would produce estimates PRE ( Despite this limitation of the data, it seems unlikely that the effect of approval of the Jeffords switch on approval of Jeffords' job as senator is a more powerful cause than feelings about Jeffords' job as senator on opinions of Jeffords' party switch. The general orientation towards Jeffords, approval of his job performance, is likely to affect opinions of an action, his party switch, since the former is a general disposition and the latter is a specific action. negative, contrary to the policy-balancing model.35 The crucial test of the balancing model, however, involves moderate voters who saw a difference between the parties. The coefficient for the interaction effect between Moderate and Party Difference is in the predicted direction, but it is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Contrary to policy-balancing models, then, there appears to be no relationship between moderate citizens who saw a difference between the parties and approval of the Jeffords switch.36 Although included as a control variable, Age is the only demographic variable that is statistically distinguishable from zero. I will discuss this finding below.
These results suggest that the preference for divided government, at least as measured by approval of Jeffords' party switch, is a by-product of factors devoid of any policy-balancing intention on the part of citizens. The most important predictor appears to be attitudes towards Jeffords, namely his constituent's approval of his job as Senator. In the final analysis, the constituent-representative relationship is the most appropriate place to look for the causes of divided government. When voters produce divided government, it happens congressional district by congressional district or state by state. In other words, it is the local choices of candidates, and all that they bring to the table, that bring about divided government.37 Table 3 As mentioned, additional questions on the national poll permit further examination of unintentionalist claims. Specifically, the national poll included items about the party 'most likely to make the right decisions' about the federal budget, Social Security, keeping the economy strong and spending taxpayers' money. By combining these items into a single additive index, I am able to test the theory of issue ownership -the notion that the party best able to handle the important issues of the day will garner advantage in the court of public opinion. For each 'Democratic party' response to a question, the respondent receives a score of one. Thus, Democratic Issue Ownership (F'note continued) Furthermore, in the context of the survey, the question on approval of Senator Jeffords job as senator was asked third following standard questions about presidential and congressional approval, respectively. The question about approval of Jeffords' party switch, the dependent variable, was Question 7. Thus, there were no cues in the survey about Jeffords' party switch to affect opinion of his job as senator. Coupled with the fact that the poll was conducted more than three months after Jeffords' party switch and media attention had shifted elsewhere, it is unlikely that respondents were thinking about it at the beginning of the survey when asked about his job approval. 35 
